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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL E. WOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMPSON FLYING SERVICE and 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
NAUTRE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16912 
A writ of review was filed by Michael E. Wood to review 
the final Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah denying 
him temporary total disability benefits for which he had 
applied pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
A hearing was held in this matter before Administrative 
Law Judge Keith E. Sohm on November 5, 1979. On November 28, 
1979, Judge Sohm entered an order denying the claimant's 
application for temporary total disability benefits on the 
ground that his injury did not arise from an accident which 
occurred in the course of his employment and on the ground 
that the applicant was not totally disabled during the 
period of time for which he sought compensation. A Motion 
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for Review of this Order was filed by the applicant. On 
January 22, 1980, the Industrial Commission denied the 
Motion for Review and adopted the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law made by the Administrative Law Judge as its 
Final Order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant respectfully requests that the Supreme 
Court affirm the Order of the Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff Michael E. Wood sustained a slight con-
cusion in a fall from a golf cart which occurred at the Salt 
Lake County Airport on July 29, 1978. At the time of his 
injury he was employed as the Vice President of Thompson 
Flying Service whose off ices were located at the airport. 
In addition to certain managerial responsibilities Mr. Wood 
flew as a pilot for his employer. 
On the afternoon of the day he was injured, Mr. Barry 
Hansen, an employee of Thompson Flying Service, approached 
Mr. Wood in his office and sought his advice about marital 
problems. (R. 41) Mr. Wood, Mr. Hansen and several other 
employees agreed that that evening after work, at about 8:00, 
they would talk the matter over. (R. 42) After acquiring 
beer for a Lear jet crew and for themselves, they remained 
at the airport after that hour "talking about the problem" 
(R. 42) Mr. Wood stated he drank two or three cans of beer. (R. 72) 
Mr. Wood testified that sometime thereafter he and Mr. 
Hansen and the others went riding in a golf cart. He explained 
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that at approximately 10:30 p.m., while riding in the cart, 
I was trying to alleviate some of his 
problems--we engaged in a little tiny 
bit of horseplay .••• 
(R. 42) Mr. Wood stated that he poured a can of beer into 
Mr. Hansen's lap who then attempted to pour a can of beer 
into his lap. (R. 71) To avoid being showered with beer 
himself, Mr. Wood stood up in the moving golf cart and fell 
over backwards, striking his head and sustaining the injury 
complained of. (R. 71) The plaintiff was rendered unconscious 
after his fall and then apparently lapsed into sleep; he was 
snoring when the others in the cart retrieved him. (R. 46) 
Mr. Wood was taken to the emergency room at LDS Hospital 
where it was determined he had suffered a concussion. He was 
found to have an odor of ethanol on his breath and was believed 
by admitting physicians to be intoxicated. (R. 2) He 
was hospitalized during the following ten days for testing and 
observation and returned to work for Thompson Flying Service 
on August 15, 1979, approximately two and a half weeks after 
his accident. Medical expenses incident to his hospitalization 
and compensation for his period of disability were paid 
by the defendant State Insurance Fund. 
Upon his return to work, Mr. Wood resumed his position 
with Thompson Flying Service which he retained until the following 
January. During that period of time he worked full time for his 
employer and received an increase in his salary. (R. 53) 
Shortly after his injury, Mr. Wood was required by Federal 
Aviation Association regulations to renew the medical certif i-
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cation which qualified him for a first or second class pilot's 
license. {R. 48-49). The medical certification expired by 
its own terms every six months and a first or second class 
license was necessary for eligibility to fly as a pilot. 
Because of his injury and hospitalization, he was denied the 
necessary medical certificate (R. 51-52) and was unable to 
fly as a pilot until the following year in September, 1979, 
when his certificate was reissued. (R. 62) 
On January 22, 1979, after working full time in a managerial 
capacity for five months after his injury, Mr. Wood resigned 
his position with Thompson Flying Service. He testified 
that he resigned under pressure from the owner of his company 
which was brought to bear on him because other employees had 
complained about his harsh style of management. (R. 54-56). 
After his resignation, Mr. Wood renewed his efforts to 
obtain second or first class certification as a pilot. (R. 
58) He was admitted to the Veterans Administration Hospital 
for a three day neurological evaluation on January 29, 1979 
which revealed a minor brain wave abnormality. (R. 59) His 
medical certification was once again denied. {R. 59) Mr. 
Wood decided to appeal the denial and underwent additional 
medical testing at the University of Utah Medical Center. 
The neurologists who examined Mr. Wood on that occasion felt 
that his denial of certification was unjustified and submitted 
reports to the FAA supporting him in his assertion that 
there was no medical reason to withhold certification. (R. 
61) As the result of a hearing before the National Transportation 
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Safety Board on September 13, 1979 Mr. Wood was recertified 
as a pilot. 
From January 22, 1979, the date of his resignation from 
Thompson Flying Service, until September 13, 1979, Mr. wood held 
a ground school offering flight instruction which did not require 
him to function as a pilot. (R. 64-65) He also performed 
odd jobs at his apartment complex to defray the cost of his 
rent. (R. 64) 
Mr. Wood alleged before the Industrial Commission that he 
was totally disabled during the period of time from his resignation 
to his recertification and that he is entitled to temporary total 
disability compensation for this period of disability. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPLICANT WAS NOT DISABLED 
DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME FOR 
WHICH HE SEEKS TEMPORARY TOTAL 
DISABILITY BENEFITS. 
The Industrial Commission denied the plaintiff's application 
on the basis of its finding that his injury did not occur 
in the course of his employment and its finding that he was 
not totally disabled during the period of time for which he 
seeks compensation benefits. The Commission found that Mr. 
Wood's departure from Thompson's Flying Service was not 
related to his injury and that he was not incapacitated 
during the following nine months. Neither in his Motion for 
Review nor his Petition to this Court has the plaintiff cha!-
lenged the Commission's finding that he was not totally disabled 
during the period for which he seeks benefits. No other award 
_c:_ 
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was sought. The defendants submit that the Commission's 
undisputed finding that the plaintiff was not totally disabled 
during the period for which he seeks compensation is supported 
by his own uncontroverted evidence and is dispositive of this 
appeal. 
The basis for entitlement to temporary total disability 
benefits was discussed by this Court in its opinion in the 
case of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 
617 (Utah 1977). On appeal, the defendant employer and 
defendant insurance carrier contended that the Industrial 
Commission exceeded its authority by awarding temporary 
total disability compensation to an injured employer during 
a~ unusually lengthy period of recovery from her industrial 
injury. This Court affirmed the Commission's order and 
stated that 
Such benefits are intended to compensate 
a workman during the period of healing and 
until he is able to return to work, usually 
when released for that purpose by his 
doctor . . . it is properly awardable only 
during actual inability to work which is 
found to have been caused by and is properly 
attributable to the industrial accident. 
Id. 562 P.2d at 619-620. 
Considering generally the definition of compensable 
disability, Professor Larsen states in 2 Workmen's Compensation 
Law, §57.10, p. 10-4 
The key to the understanding of this problem 
is the recognition, at the outset, that the 
disability concept is a blend of two ingredients, 
-6-
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whose recurrence in different proportions 
gives rise to most controversial disability 
questions: The first ingredient is disability 
in the medical or physical sense, as evidenced 
by obvious loss of members of by medical testi-
mony that the claimant simply cannot make the 
necessary muscular movements and exertions; 
the second ingredient is 'de facto' inability 
to earn wages, as evidenced by proof that 
claimant has not in fact earned anything. 
During the period between his resignation from Thompson 
Flying Service in January, 1979 and his recertification as a 
pilot in September, 1979, the plaintiff was not, by his own 
admission, unable to work. He operated a ground school and 
did odd jobs around his apartment complex. Nor did those 
nine months constitute a "healing period" such as was referred 
to by this Court in the Ortega decision. His period of 
convalescence extended for some two weeks after his injury 
whereupon he resumed his full time position with his regular 
employer. The plaintiff's termination from his regular 
employment five months later was due to personal conflicts 
and not to the residual effects, if any, of his accidental 
injury. Mr. Wood was not temporarily totally disabled as 
that status has been construed by this Court. 
In fact, the plaintiff did not establish that he sustained 
any compensable disability, whether total or partial, as the 
term is defined by Professor Larsen. Although neurological 
examination revealed a slight brain wave irregularity after 
his fall, the applicant was not functionally incapacitated 
or physically limited in any manner as a result of this irregularity. 
The plaintiff testified that he experienced no physical difficulty 
or health problems after his injury, either before or after 
his resignation from Thompson Flying Service. (R. 72) His 
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own treating physician, Dr. Laverne Erickson, found that in 
December of 1978 he exhibited no loss of function or symptoms 
of neurological impairment. (R. 5) And Mr. Wood asserted 
his right to certification as a pilot from January, 1979 until 
September, 1979 on the ground that he was, in fact, completely 
heal thy. The plaintiff sustained no medical disability whatsoever, 
Secondly, the plaintiff established no loss of earning 
capacity as a result of his injury. To the contrary, his 
salary was increased upon his return to Thompson Flying 
Service. Though the private tutoring in which he engaged 
after his departure may not have been profitable, his own work 
history establishes that his capacity to earn wages without 
flying as a pilot was not diminished by his injury. 
Thus, the plaintiff failed not only to establish that he 
was totally disabled as a result of his injury, but that 
he sustained any compensable disability whatsoever other than 
his initial period of convalescence. 
Plaintiff asserts his claim to compensation because of 
the refusal of the National Transportation Safety Board to 
certify him as a pilot for a period of time after his injury. 
Their finding was based on an irregularity in brain wave 
patterns that in no way constituted a physical incapacity 
and did not disqualify him from other gainful employment. 
The Commission's denial of temporary total disability benefits 
is supported by the plaintiff's own assertions before the 
Commission and before the National Transportation Safety 
Board that he was physically unimpaired after his injury, as 
well as by the opinion of his treatina 1'.)r~l'=',.;r'!~ .'."'.'.'."' __ ,..;i ,_ __ ,_.: .... Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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work history after his injury. An inelegibility for flight 
status based upon the peculiar medical standards applicable 
to airline pilots cannot be equated with total disability to 
work, a condition the plaintiff clearly did not suffer. For 
this reason, the Commission's denial of the plaintiff's 
application for temporary total disability benefits should 
be affirmed. 
POINT II 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INJURED IN 
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
The Industrial Commission weighed the evidence and properly 
applied the law in making its additional finding that the 
plaintiff was not acting in the course of his employment at 
the time of, his injury. The Commission found that the conduct 
in which the plaintiff engaged at the time was horseplay. It 
analyzed the evidence in accordance with the legal test of 
the compensability of injury arising from horseplay proposed 
by Professor Larsen in lA Workmen's Compensation Law §23.00 
and adopted by this Court in its decision in Prows v. Industrial Comm' 
Utah Sup. Ct. No. 16456 (April 4, 1980). 
In Prows this Court held that an employee who was 
injured in a rubber band fight was entitled to compensation 
for his injury because his deviation from the performance of 
his regular duties was slight and because the activity in 
question was a customary and forseeable form of diversion 
among his fellow employees. In reaching its decision, this 
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Court noted that Utah Code Ann. §34-1-45 provides that an 
accident is compensable only if it arises "out of or in the 
course of" a claimant's employment. The Court adopted 
Professor Larsen's view that 
Whenever the basic controversy stems from 
the nature of a course of conduct deliberately 
undertaken by the claimant, there is primarily 
a question of course of employment. 
Larsen, supra, Vol. IA, §2361 p. 5-140. 
This Court then evaluated the evidence by applying the 
four part test espoused by Larsen for determining the compensabilH 
of an injury caused by horseplay initiated by the claimant, 
holding that, 
Whether initiation of or participation in 
horseplay is a deviation from course of 
employment depends on (1) the extent and 
seriousness of the deviation, (2) the complete-
ness of the deviation (i.e., whether it was 
commingled with the performance of duty or 
involved an abandonment of duty), (3) the extent 
to which the practice of horseplay had become 
an accepted part of the employment, and (4) 
the extent to which the nature of the employ-
ment may be expected to include some such horse-
play. 
Prows, supra. 
The plaintiff contends on appeal that at the time of his 
injury he was engaging in public relations responsibilities, 
that he and his co-workers discussed business related subjects 
during the evening, and that h~s horseplay was an insignificant 
deviation from his employment duties. Analyzing the evidence 
in the case at bar according to the principles announced in 
Prows, as the Commission did in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, it is clear, however, that substantial 
-10-
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evidence supports the administrative order. 
The Conunission was required at the outset to determine 
to what extent, and how severely, the plaintiff deviated 
from the course of his employment. Although Mr. Wood 
testified that his working hours were flexible and that 
occasionally he worked as late as 10:00 at night (R. 44, 
45), he testified in reference to his gathering with co-
workers on the evening of his injury as follows: 
That afternoon Barry Hansen--who was the one 
that was over-flying Las Vegas--came into my 
office, sat down, and indicated he was having some 
marital difficulties. And, because I had been 
through a divorce, he wanted to talk to me. 
So that evening after work, at about 8:00 o'clock, 
myself, Barry Hansen, Wayne Wienecke--the owner 
of Thompson's--Jim Powers--the Assistant of Main-
tenance of Thomspn's--plus Jim Hunt, a client 
of Thompson's, we all decided that we would, you 
know, talk this matter over. 
Because we were at the airport, and there was 
a Lear 35 in there, they ordered two six-packs 
of beer. We got the beer for them, they gave us 
each a can, and we stayed around there talking about 
the problem. (R. 41-42) (emphasis added) 
It was the plaintiff's testimony that his purpose and the 
purpose of his co-workers in remaining at the airport after 
8:00 o'clock in the evening was to discuss Mr. Hansen's marital 
problems. He referred to that period of time as "after work". 
Though it is not clear what other activities the group engaged 
in between 8:00 and 10:30 p.m., the time of the accident, the 
plaintiff testified that he consumed several cans of beer (R. 72) 
and that immediately prior to his fall he was riding around 
the airport in a golf cart on a trip which he never claimed 
was taken for an employment related purpose. 
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In determining the extent to which the injured employee 
in Prows, supra, had deviated from the course of his employment 
this Court stated 
Recognizing that "a little nonsense now 
and then is relished by the best of [workers]," 
it is clear that the better reasoned decisions 
make allowances for the fact that workers cannot 
be expected to attend strictly to their assigned 
duties every minute they are on the job. That 
is not to say that substantial excursions frOili 
job assignments need be tolerated or if injury 
occurs during such excursions, compensation need 
be paid. (emphasis added). 
Prows, supra, p. 7. 
The defendants submit there is substantial evidence that 
when he remained at the airport to drink beer, discuss marital 
problems and tour the area in a golf cart the plaintiff embarked 
on a course of conduct which was totally outside the course 
of his employment. 
The Commission next considered the completeness of the 
deviation, that is, whether or not it was comingled with the 
performance of employment related duties. The plaintiff testi-
f ied that during the course of the evening he discussed employ-
ment related subjects as well as marital problems with his co-
workers. (R. 70) He also testified that he was fulfilling 
"public relations" responsibilities during that period of time. 
(R. 44) The plaintiff did not specify what business topics 
were discussed during the evening nor what public relations 
duties he performed. 
In evaluating whether the deviation from employment in the 
Prows case was complete, this Court referred to the following 
illustration made by Prof. Larsen 
-12-
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. . . the particular act of horseplay is 
entitled to be judged according to the same 
standards of exten[t] and duration of deviation 
that are accepted in orther fi[e)lds, such as 
resting, seeking personal comfort, or indulging 
in incidental personal errands. If an employee 
momentarily walks over to a co-employee to 
engage in a friendly word or two, this would 
nowadays be called an insubstantial deviation. 
If he accompanies this friendly word with a 
playful jab in the ribs, surely it cannot be 
said that an entirely new set of principles 
has come into play. The incident remains a 
simple human diversion subject to the same 
tests of extent of departure from the employment 
as if the playful gesture had been omitted. 
At the other extreme, there are cases in 
which the prankster undertakes a practical 
joke which necessitates the complete abandon-
ment of the employment and concentration 
of all his energies for a substantial part of 
his working time on the horseplay enterprise. 
When this abandonment is sufficiently complete 
and extensive, it can only be treated the 
same as abandonment of the employment for any 
other personal purpose, such as an extended 
personal errand or an intentional four-hour 
nap. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) 
lA Larsen at 5-142 to 5-143. 
Contrasted to the plaintiff's general testimony that he 
engaged in work related activities on the evening of his injury 
is his testimony that the purpose of his gathering with fellow 
employees was to discuss personal problems (R. 42) and that the 
purpose of his horseplay in the golf cart was "to alleviate" 
some of his friend's problems. (R. 42) The Commission is, of 
course, required in its function as trier of fact to weigh 
an applicant's testimony and to determine the credence it should 
be accorded. In this instance, the plaintiff's own description 
of the circumstances of his injury support a finding that 
-13-
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the time and energy he devoted to a beer fight in a touring 
golf cart represented an abandonment of his employment even 
if he had discussed business at some point during the evening. 
The extent to which horseplay has become a part of the 
plaintiff's employment also is to be considered in determining 
the compensability of his injuries. The plaintiff introduced no 
evidence before the Industrial Commission that beer fights in golf! 
carts were a normal occurrence in the course of his employment. 
In the Prows case, evidence was adduced at the administrative 
level that employees engaged in rubber band fights at least 
two to three times a month, if not more frequently. Clearly, this j 
Court concluded, such horseplay had become a part of the ernploymenJ 
By contrast, in the case at bar there is no evidence that a beer 
fight had ever occurred among employees of Thompson Flying 
Service either during or after normal working hours, nor was 
there any evidence that such occurrences were a customary part 
of the plaintiff's employment. 
Finally, the legal test applicable to injuries by horseplay 
requires an evaluation of the extent to which the nature of 
the plaintiff's employment may be expected to include some 
such horseplay. This Court stated in reference to the fourth 
basis of analysis that 
this element of Larsen's approach focuses on 
the forseeability of horseplay in any given 
employment environment and on the particular 
act of horseplay involved. 
Prows, supra, p. 9 
-14-
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The defendants submit it is not reasonably forseeable 
that an employee who remains on his employer's premises after 
normal working hours to discuss a co-employee's marital pro-
blems will take a ride in a golf cart while drinking beer, will 
pour beer in a fellow employee's lap, and will lean backwards in 
the moving cart to avoid being showered with beer himself. 
Assuming the plaintiff's testimony is to be credited, that he 
was also discussing business and engaging in public relations 
on the evening of his injury, and assuming further that alcohol 
were a common incident of his public relations duties, it does 
not follow that the particular unusual act of horseplay which he 
initiated was forseeable. 
This Court in Prows stated that 
By adopting the approach suggested by Larson, 
this Court does not intend the adoption of a test 
which by mechancial application will in cases 
·involving horseplay dictate a "correct result". 
Indeed this approach is not susceptible of 
mechanical application but rather is intended 
as a method of analysis to assist the Industrial 
Commission in consideration of future cases 
coming before it involving horseplay. It is 
this Court's view that when the underlying policy 
of the compensation act is effecuated [sic] in 
the light of the analysis suggested herein, a 
rational result can be expected. 
The Industrial Commission was required in this case to 
consider the evidence as a whole, to resolve inconsistencies in 
the applicant's testimony, to judge his credibility and to 
determine in light of the principles espoused by this Court 
whether the plaintiff was acting in the course of his employment 
at the time of him injury. The plaintiff's own testimony that 
-15-
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he was at the airport on the evening in question to discuss 
his friend's marital problems, that he drank beer during the 
time he was there and that he initiated a beer fight to cheer 
up his friend support the Commission's findings. The plaintiff's 
failure to describe the nature or purpose of any business 
activities which were said to have been conducted and the absence 
of evidence that similar horseplay was a customary or forseeable 
incident of his employment must also be considered in support 
of the Commission's order. 
In sum, the defendants submit that the evidence was 
fairly weighed by the Industrial Commission in light of the 
proper legal analysis and that in ruling that the plaintiff's 
injury was not compensable the Commission in no way abused 
its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence that the plaintiff was acting outside the 
course of his employment at the time of his injury was sub-
stantial and the defendants contend the Commission correctly 
ruled that the plaintiff's injury was not compensable. The 
Commission also ruled that the plaintiff was not eligible for 
the only benefits he sought, in that he was not totally dis-
abled during the period for which he sought temporary total 
disability compensation. The plaintiff has never contended he 
was disabled as a result of his injury but only that he 
should be compensated because he was not able to be licensed 
as a pilot for the following year. As there is no basis in 
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law or fact for his claim to the benefits he seeks, the defendant~ 
submit the Commission would have been required to deny his 
application even if it had found that his injury occurred in 
the course of his employment. The Commission's Order should 
therefore be affirmed. 
DATED this 12th day of June, 1980. 
TIMOTHY C. HOUPT 
Black & Moore 
Attorney for Defendants 
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